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Abstract
Users of psychedelic drugs often report that their sense of being a self or ‘I’ distinct from the rest of the world has dimin-
ished or altogether dissolved. Neuroscientific study of such ‘ego dissolution’ experiences offers a window onto the nature of
self-awareness. We argue that ego dissolution is best explained by an account that explains self-awareness as resulting
from the integrated functioning of hierarchical predictive models which posit the existence of a stable and unchanging en-
tity to which representations are bound. Combining recent work on the ‘integrative self’ and the phenomenon of self-
binding with predictive processing principles yields an explanation of ego dissolution according to which self-
representation is a useful Cartesian fiction: an ultimately false representation of a simple and enduring substance to which
attributes are bound which serves to integrate and unify cognitive processing across levels and domains. The self-model is
not a mere narrative posit, as some have suggested; it has a more robust and ubiquitous cognitive function than that. But
this does not mean, as others have claimed, that the self-model has the right attributes to qualify as a self. It performs some
of the right kinds of functions, but it is not the right kind of entity. Ego dissolution experiences reveal that the self-model
plays an important binding function in cognitive processing, but the self does not exist.
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Introduction
In this paper, we argue that ‘ego dissolution’ in psychedelic ex-
perience is a window on the nature of self-awareness. By ‘self’
here we mean an entity, substance, or bare particular that in-
stantiates properties. Just as the mind infers that properties are
possessed by objects, it infers that the self is an object whose
continued existence explains the co-occurrence of physical and
psychological attributes. We argue that the mind models the
self as standing in the same relation to its properties as objects
in general stand to theirs. Under this strategy, higher-level
models predict that features represented at lower levels are at-
tributes of objects. Thus, for example, in perceptual and
sensorimotor feature binding the higher-level modelling of ob-
jects is used to integrate representations of features into coher-
ent wholes. We see and feel objects, not concatenations of
features, as a result of this top-down process. Similarly, we ar-
gue, the self is postulated by higher-level processes as an entity
to facilitate the binding or integration of information. We argue
that this explains a Cartesian intuition that the self is a simple
indivisible entity. In psychedelic experience these integrative
processes are disrupted, leading to the phenomenology of ego
dissolution.
Representing the self as an entity which sustains interocep-
tion, affection, cognition, and perception facilitates the integra-
tion of information and allows preferential allocation of
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resources to self-relevant information through the coordination
of the salience and emotional processing systems. The former
allocates processing resources adaptively by biasing cognition
and the latter coordinates the processing of information rele-
vant to the goals and interests of the organism (e.g. detecting
and responding to danger is the interest served by the emotion
of fear).
We support this idea with evidence from two related sour-
ces. The first is research by Sui and Humphreys (2015) on cogni-
tive binding and the role of the self-model in enhancing it. The
postulation of a self to which information is relevant makes a
difference to the integrity of representations. However, the
mechanisms involved model that self as a heuristic, a way of
making information ‘sticky’, rather than as a way of tracking
the fluctuating cognitive fortunes of an actual entity. Self-
awareness is the experience of cognitive processes in which
these binding processes are intact. Sui and Humphreys, how-
ever, are not very precise about the nature of the self. Their
work suggests that the self is the entity to which things matter.
We suggest that emotional processes play a crucial role here
since they tell the organism how and why things matter.
The second is evidence provided by the phenomenon of ‘ego
dissolution’ reported in psychedelic experience. We argue that
evidence suggests that psychedelics target mechanisms on
which self-binding depends. Psychedelic experience degrades
these binding processes, enabling subjects to experience cogni-
tion not bound by self-models. We emphasize that the ‘self’
which dissolves in psychedelic experience is not an actual en-
tity or an object of perception, interoception, or introspection
but an entity inferred by the mind to predict the flow of experi-
ence in and across cognitive modalities. As Thomas Metzinger
put it: ‘There is just no entity there, no individual substance,
and scientifically we can predict and explain everything we
want to predict and explain in a much more parsimonious way’
(quoted in Marshall 2016).
We can contrast Metzinger’s view with Hohwy and
Michael’s (2017) ‘causal realist interpretation of the reference
of intentional terms and of the self’ which argues that the
causal power exerted by the object(s) of self-representation
implies a causally efficacious entity underlying the hierarchy
of integrative processes. Sui and Humphreys similarly argue
that the binding power of self-representation cannot be ex-
plained by a self that is essentially a theoretical or narrative ab-
straction. Ultimately we will argue, on the basis of the
psychedelic evidence, that Sui and Humphreys, and Hohwy
and Michael, are right to reject a purely narrative view of the
underpinnings of self-awareness: the self-model is deeper,
more robust, and more cognitively ubiquitous than that. But
we will side with Metzinger and against Hohwy and Michael in
denying that anything, including the self-model, possesses the
right attributes to qualify as a self.
The issues are subtle since all sides agree on the integrative
role of the self-model and the predictive hierarchical nature of
self-modelling. Our contention is that the phenomenology of
ego dissolution is easier to explain if the subject is experiencing
the disintegration of a system whose integration she normally
experiences in terms of an indivisible mental substance. On this
basis, we propose that the right attributes to qualify as a self are
those represented by the self-model, but not instantiated by
anything actual: indivisibility, substantiality, and strict identity
over time, as well as distinctness from and ownership/author-
ship of experiences, thoughts, and feelings. The concept of a
self does not just delineate a functional role (cause of behav-
iour) but posits a realizer of that role with specific attributes.
From the non-instantiation of those attributes we conclude that
the self-model fails to refer (compare the elimination of caloric
in the mechanical theory of heat).
We offer a diagnosis of this phenomenon in terms of self-
binding (i.e., the preferential enhancement of cognitive binding
for self-relevant information). We discuss the nature of binding
and self-binding, arguing that self-binding does not entail the
existence of an object to which attributes are bound—though it
does require the representation of an object, to which represen-
tations of attributes are bound. We then turn to the main sec-
tions of the paper that explain the phenomenon of ego
dissolution in psychedelic experience. We describe the phe-
nomenology and neural correlates and show that ego dissolu-
tion is best understood as a phenomenon of unbinding. In a
final section, we situate our account in the conceptual frame-
work of contemporary debates and address some puzzles and
remaining issues. In brief, our conclusion is that even in florid
psychedelic experience the self-model is never entirely de-
stroyed. Rather, as the coherence it normally imposes degrades,
we become aware that our normal experience of unity depends
on a modelling process. Just as disorders of feature binding help
disclose the nature of object representation, ego dissolution dis-
closes the nature of self-awareness.
Furthermore, our normal experience of unity compels the in-
ference not just that we are a self, but that that self is a
Cartesian substance. The self-model is a hypothesis of a unitary
and persisting entity—a bare particular—which owns and in-
habits the body, which thinks the thoughts, which feels the feel-
ings, and which was present in past experience and will be
present in future experience. It turns out that controversy over
the neural basis of self-awareness turns on whether the mecha-
nisms which produce the experience of self-awareness perform
their integrative tasks by modelling the self as a simple indivisi-
ble substance.
Binding
The notion of binding solves a problem first discussed for visual
representation. It arises from evidence that different visual fea-
tures of objects, such as colour, shape, and motion, are
processed in separate areas of visual cortex. These representa-
tional elements are combined into coherent, unified percepts by
feature binding processes. Evidence for the existence of feature
binding mechanisms comes from conditions in which they fail,
such as ‘illusory conjunctions’ of features induced experimen-
tally or resulting from pathology (Burwick 2014). An example
might be a subject presented with a green circle and a blue
square who misperceives a blue circle and a green square.
Binding can be described and explained at the phenomenal
(unity of experience), cognitive (coherence and integration), and
neural (mechanism) levels (Revonsuo 1999). There is no single
theory of the nature of binding. Some theorists treat it as a
global phenomenon involving the integration of information
across large-scale networks. Others focus on local or modular
integration of percepts or even perceptual elements, proposing
that such modular integration is necessary before candidate
representations can be globally integrated. However, in the ab-
sence of a final theory it remains true that cognition and experi-
ence require the coherent functioning of spatially and
temporally distributed neuronal populations to produce inte-
grated representations.
The resurgence of interest in the phenomenon by neurosci-
entists in the 1990s produced different theories of binding. It
has been explained in terms (i) of phase synchrony (peaks
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and valleys of waveforms occurring simultaneously) across dis-
tributed circuitry (Singer 1999); (ii) convergence zones: special-
ized circuitry that integrates signals fed forward from lower
level systems (Damasio 1989). Such convergence zones could be
hierarchically organized, elements of a percept being individu-
ally unified then fed forward to higher levels to be integrated
into the overall representation of a perceived scene; and (iii) in-
tegrative properties of layer V pyramidal cells (Bachmann 2015).
Refined versions of this idea suggest that information thus
bound passes through a processing bottleneck enabling it to be-
come the object of metacognitive processes. (i)–(iii) fit well with
attentional and global broadcast theories of consciousness,
which make availability to executive processing the essence of
consciousness. On these views unbound information cannot be
the object of conscious awareness. (iv) is a Hebbian theory that
proposes that binding consists in the frontally regulated con-
struction and maintenance of transient activity patterns in
frontal–posterior (especially parietal) circuitry, stabilizing and
integrating perceptual representations, which then become
available to executive functioning (Ballard et al. 1983; van Essen
et al. 1992).
Here, we want to note several aspects of binding theory. It is
proposed to explain the unity and stability of conscious experi-
ence and it implies a neural mechanism.1 It explains the unity
of conscious experience in terms of functional coupling be-
tween cognitive subsystems and there is a strong implication
that such coupling requires frontal involvement. Relatedly, the
disruption, alteration, or disappearance of consciousness is pro-
duced by the disruption of frontal–posterior coupling (Mashour
2013). This last point reminds us that consciousness comes in
different forms and that any theory of the role of binding in con-
sciousness should help explain (ultimately) sleep, dreaming,
coma, alert waking, and psychosis, as well as the state we are
interested in here: psychedelic experience.
We think that the phenomenon of ego dissolution is a case
where understanding the nature of phenomenal unbinding can
illuminate the nature of binding: in this case, the binding that
underlies the phenomenon of self-awareness.
Binding and Predictive Processing
When the binding problem and tentative solutions were first
proposed the predictive processing theory had not undergone
its recent revival2 but we note that it provides an elegant frame-
work for understanding the binding of information. Predictive
processing theories of cognition treat the brain as a neurally in-
stantiated processing hierarchy, with generative models at
higher levels predicting bottom-up inputs from lower levels.
The discrepancy between predicted and actual input takes the
form of an error signal. Error signals are cancelled either by
updating the model or by taking action to alter the discrepant
input (Hohwy 2013).
This framework provides an elegant solution to the binding
problem. Regularities in sensory input over time constrain the
combinations of features into objects that will be predictively
successful. So the binding of features together into coherent
percepts is determined by the probabilistic model which best
matches present and past inputs, and the choice of probabilistic
model is determined by regularities in the inputs. Binding, on
this view, is essentially a kind of top-down abductive inference.
If I am fielding in a game of cricket, the patterns in the inputs to
my visual system are efficiently and reliably predicted by a
model that posits various entities—a batter, a bat, a ball—each
possessing various attributes such as colour, shape, location,
speed, and direction of motion. Thus, object perception is a
matter of hypothesizing an ontology that makes the flow of sen-
sory input intelligible and predictable.
Our central idea here is that self-representation can be un-
derstood using the predictive framework in the same way as ob-
ject representation. The self-model represents a persisting
object in order to make sense of, unify, and predict ongoing pat-
terns of egocentric, salient, autobiographical experience.
The notion of egocentric experience reflects the fact that ex-
perience is spatially and temporally organized from a perspec-
tive or location such as point of view or origin of movement. For
example, sensorimotor control depends on integration of sen-
sory input at a point or points internal to the organism.
Salience refers to that fact that the organism is bombarded
by information only a fraction of which is relevant to its goals
and interests. Each of those goals, which range from phyloge-
netically ancient (maintaining homeostasis) to recent (main-
taining social reputation) creates a dimension of salience
which requires the mind to allocate processing resources adap-
tively. The ability to represent these multiple dimensions of sa-
lience depends on hierarchically organized neural circuitry,
which focuses perception and cognition, biasing cognitive sys-
tems to the processing of relevant information. This salience
network (SLN) coordinates the interaction of neural systems
that detect and evaluate relevance, bias processing accordingly
and, importantly, allow us to feel the consequences as affective
states.
Thus, we are organisms who experience and act in the world
from a unique physical (spatiotemporal) and affective orienta-
tion. In the process, the mind makes models to explain the way
the world makes us feel as we move through it. When we delib-
erate on and communicate the resultant experience we repre-
sent the integrated functioning of these egocentric and
autobiographical models as unified through time in a single
entity.
In effect the salience system links the egocentric self-models
that manage the physical/bodily interface with autobiographi-
cal models which situate the organism historically. The salience
system tells the organism which information matters and how
it matters, moment to moment and through time. In effect the
salience system is constantly creating the illusion of substantial
selfhood by binding information into a representation not of the
world in itself, but of the world as it matters to the organism.
As Seth put it:
emotion and embodied selfhood are grounded in active inference
of those signals most likely to be ‘me’ across interoceptive and ex-
teroceptive domains. In humans, self-related predictive coding si-
multaneously engages multiple levels of self-representation, in-
cluding physiological homeostasis, physical bodily integrity,
morphology and position, and—more speculatively—the metacog-
nitive and narrative ‘I’.
(2013, 570).
The narrative ‘I’ is Dennett’s (1991) narrative self or Damasio’s
(2010) autobiographical self, which allows us to experience
1 Note that cognitive binding and the unity of consciousness
are not synonymous, but the former is a serious contender
for an explanation, at least partial, of the latter; cf.
Revonsuo (1999).
2 The central insights of the predictive processing framework
go back at least to Helmholtz (1925) and arguably to Kant
(Swanson 2016).
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high-level (attempted) control of the integrated functioning of
the egocentric and salience systems.
We think that Dennett is correct that the narrative self is a
model which abstracts from the integrated functioning of a hi-
erarchy of egocentric and salience systems3 to posit a simple
unified entity of which those integrated features are attributes.
This view is consistent with the idea that as functioning disinte-
grates we will no longer feel like unified entities.
The Architecture of Subjectivity
That the SLN is activated in such a variety of conditions, ranging
from basic perceptual processing to high-level metacognition, is
a consequence of the way minds evolved. The mind did not
evolve to range impartially over all the information available in
the world and represent its causal and conceptual structure. It
allocates its resources to information which is rewarding or
valuable. We define salient information as that which is repre-
sented as ‘potentially rewarding for the organism’. This allows
for the context sensitivity and multidimensionality of salience.
It also fits with the neurocomputational interpretation of the
role of the mesolimbic dopamine system as a reward prediction
system whose activity makes information salient by increasing
gain in target circuitry.
The self-model allows us to feel that the experiences result-
ing from the interplay of the salience system with other (cogni-
tive, emotional, and affective) systems whose activity it
coordinates belong to a consistent unified entity: the self. One
interesting feature of ego dissolution is that it produces highly
salient experiences (they have the ‘dopamine halo’) unmoored
from normal affective responses and the sense that they are
happening to the self. Our hypothesis is that this is because the
self-model is no longer smoothly integrating these experiences
by attributing them to the same entity.
A consistent finding in the case of self-referential processing
is activity in a network of midline structures whose hubs are in-
volved in emotion, motivation, salience, and the switching of
attention between neutral/external and self-relevant informa-
tion (Qin and Northoff 2011). These structures are less active
when attention is focused ‘outward’ so to speak on the percep-
tual environment or on problem solving with an impersonal as-
pect. It seems clear that stable, context-sensitive activity in this
midline-centred network is an essential aspect of cognitive
function. Organisms need to be able to allocate cognitive re-
sources appropriately according to whether the context requires
accurate representation of the world (concrete or abstract) or
the significance of the world to their goals and interests.
The cortical midline structures repeatedly implicated in self-
reference divide into two distinct, large-scale functional net-
works. The SLN, which we have been discussing, is centred on
key hub regions such as the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), im-
plicated in error detection and task switching, and the anterior
insular cortex (AIC), implicated in interoceptive processing and
conscious emotional feelings (Seth 2013). Meanwhile, the
much-discussed default mode network (DMN) is centred on key
hub regions such as the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC),
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and inferior parietal lobule (IPL;
Davey et al. 2016).
The DMN was originally identified in neuroimaging studies
of the resting brain (Raichle et al. 2001). It has since been found
to be activated by many self-referential tasks, including
‘prospection’ or ‘mental time travel’—the autobiographical sim-
ulation of past and future experience—and theory of mind
(Spreng and Grady 2010). Of course, mind-wandering in task-
free conditions often concerns self-referential themes. The pio-
neering studies of Damasio, and much subsequent research,
support the view that the MPFC is centrally involved in the attri-
bution of personal relevance to (that is to say, the egocentric
evaluation of) actual or simulated autobiographical episodes
(D’Argembeau 2013). In relation to the different levels of self-
modelling, the DMN is implicated in higher-level, narrative self-
representation, as opposed to the more minimal embodied
form of self-awareness supported by the SLN.
The PCC is a functionally enigmatic region with considerably
higher metabolic activity and structural connectivity than most
brain areas, leading some to describe it as the ‘core node of the
DMN’ (Davey et al. 2016, 390). In their analysis aimed at delineat-
ing the substrates of self-reference within the DMN, Davey et al.
found that the optimal model was one in which ‘self-related
processes were driven by PCC activity and moderated by the
regulatory influences of MPFC.’ Activity in the left IPL, which is
known to play a role in the retrieval of semantic information,
was also part of the core self-reference network identified by
this analysis.
Many intriguing findings support a key role for the PCC in
self-reference. Neurofeedback studies of meditators suggest
that PCC activity co-varies not with mind wandering as such,
but with the experience of becoming ‘caught up’ in a train of
thought. Brewer proposes that the PCC is involved in getting
‘caught up in experience’, whether it be a particularly compel-
ling rumination or a drug craving—and numerous results find
meditation downregulating PCC activity (Brewer et al. 2013;
Brewer and Garrison 2014). Experimental results implicate the
PCC in processes such as integrating information about spatial
self-location and body ownership (Guterstam et al. 2015).
According to one recent model, the PCC is a key hub involved in
‘tuning’ the connectivity of many other brain networks, regulat-
ing the balance between internal and external attention, as well
as the breadth of attention (Leech and Sharp 2014). These obser-
vations about PCC function cohere with findings from psyche-
delic neuroscience which we will discuss below. First, however,
we turn to the generic function of ‘self-binding’ which seems to
be implemented by these self-processing networks.
Self-binding
The concept of self-binding comes from the work of Sui and
Humphreys (2015) who proposed it to explain why cognition
across domains and levels is enhanced for self-relevant infor-
mation. Subjects asked to classify words on the basis of self-
relatedness or meaning remember more self-related words, and
moreover remember more episodic details surrounding the
learning of those words, suggesting enhanced mnemonic bind-
ing. Meanwhile, in face processing studies, subjects are quicker
to recognize their own face than friends’ or strangers’ faces,
whether upright or inverted. Friends’ faces also have an advan-
tage over strangers’, but only in the upright condition, suggest-
ing that self-reference confers a unique Gestalt or integrative
advantage. (Other results militate against an explanation of this
effect in terms of mere familiarity.)
3 By egocentric systems here we merely mean those cognitive
systems that use an egocentric reference point (bodily, per-
ceptual, narrative) to produce their representations.
Contrast these with allocentric or decontextualized repre-
sentational systems which for example represent relations
that hold between entities irrespective of subjective
perspective.
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Sui and Humphreys also cite evidence that self-reference
enhances coupling between different temporal stages of infor-
mation processing, possibly related to temporal binding, and
enhances functional coupling between specific brain regions
such as the aforementioned DMN, implicated as a neural sub-
strate for autobiographical thought.
Sui and Humphreys also show that there is an attentional
and decision-making enhancement effect for self-related infor-
mation which speeds up sequential processing by enhancing
‘binding between different states of processing’ (Sui and
Humphreys 2015, 724). They noted that these effects could best
be explained in terms of an integrative role for self-related pro-
cessing and hence they employed the concept of self-binding.
Given the necessity for binding in establishing coherence they
then examined a role for functional coupling of distributed
circuitry consistently implicated in self-referential effects.
Dynamic causal modelling of fMRI data showed ‘self-reference
enhances the neural coupling between regions concerned with
a core self-representation (vmPFC) and with distinct domain-
specific regions associated with different components of the
self, including self-related attention (LpSTS)’ (Sui and
Humphreys 2015, 724). Meta-analyses of fMRI data reinforced
the finding that ‘there is enhanced neural coupling for self-
processing (vs. other-related processing) between the vmPFC/
pregenual anterior cingulate (pACC) and several other regions
including the bilateral anterior insula, left striatum, right thala-
mus, and amygdala’ (Sui and Humphreys 2015, 724).
Further evidence that self-relevance enhances processing
comes from the role of affect in perceptual binding. It is well-
established that perceived objects evoke immediate affective re-
sponses. Lebrecht et al. (2012) found that even paradigmatically
neutral objects such as coffee cups and clocks evoke measur-
able ‘micro-valences’, concluding that ‘valence should be con-
strued as a property of object representations’—that is, the
affective response is bound to the percept, forming a unified
representation, rather than being merely associated with it. The
view that affect is bound to perception is supported by studies
showing the role of the amygdala in driving eye saccades in face
perception, directing the gaze to emotionally salient stimuli.
At higher levels, affect is bound to memories and imagina-
tive states invoked in reverie or deliberation, a process that
seems to depend particularly on the vmPFC. This suggests that
the vmPFC is recapitulating at a higher level the role played by
the amygdala in perceptual processing; namely, coordinating
the construction of self-relevant representations. One nice dem-
onstration of this phenomenon arises in a distinction drawn be-
tween episodic (the episodic representation of previously
acquired information) and autobiographical memory (in which
the subject feels herself present as part of the recollected expe-
rience) by Asaf Gilboa:
the Ventromedial PFC . . . does so by establishing a self-related re-
trieval template that sets up the parameters against which re-
trieved memories are evaluated based on (or which give rise to) a
general intuitive ‘feeling of rightness’. Thus, the monitoring of the
veracity and perhaps cohesiveness of autobiographical memories
is primarily mediated by the ventromedial PFC.
(2004, 1345–6; our italics).
For Sui and Humphreys, the self plays far too important a role
to be dismissed as a narrative fiction. They frame their argu-
ment in terms of the function of self-reference and argue that
the integrative function they identify could not be performed by
a fiction. They describe different elements of a self-referential
processing system as constituting an ‘integrative hub for infor-
mation processing’ (2015, 719). The key nodes of the network
they identify are those implicated in emotional binding and af-
fective experience, the enhancement of attention for emotion-
ally salient and motivating information and the switching of
attention according to context.
These systems together perform the function identified by Sui
and Humphreys. At perceptual and sensory levels, they ensure
that salient information is preferentially attended to and integrated
into coherent percepts. At higher conceptual or metacognitive lev-
els, they ensure that the same is true of the representations that
figure in memories, stories, and causal explanations. In a review of
the neural correlates of self-binding, which are the substrates of
the networks we outline above, Lou et al. (2017) concluded that
‘self-awareness is an integral function of all conscious experiences,
binding conscious experiences together into a single construct
with a sense of unity of consciousness’.
This is a very strong claim. It implies that conscious experi-
ence would not arise in the absence of self-binding. The work of
Sui and Humphreys suggests that this is not the case. Their sub-
jects did not lose consciousness when perceiving self-irrelevant
information. The same is true for patients with lesions to
Neurocognitive networks implicated in self-representation
Network Key nodes Aspects of self-
representation
Result of down-regulation Relevant studies
Default Mode
Network (DMN)
Posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC), medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC), inferior
parietal lobule (IPL)
Narrative self; mental time-
travel; judgement, plan-
ning, and goals
Dissolution of narrative/
cognitive self (personal-
ity, history, goals, owner-
ship of thoughts);
compromised binding of
embodied to narrative
representations
Carhart-Harris et al. (2012);
Palhano-Fontes et al. (2015);
Bouso et al. (2015);
Tagliazucchi et al. (2016);
Speth et al. (2016)
Salience Network
(SLN)
Anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), anterior insular
cortex (AIC)
Embodied self; emotional
feeling; salience
Dissolution of embodied
self (changes to body
boundaries, spatial self-
location, personal rele-
vance of emotional
feelings)
Lebedev et al. (2015);
Tagliazucchi et al. (2016)
Ego dissolution in psychedelic experience | 5
components of this network. However, such patients do seem
to have compromised abilities in tasks (such as autobiographi-
cal simulation, personal decision making, and social interac-
tion) that we pretheoretically describe as requiring self-
awareness. As we will show, the neuroscience and phenome-
nology of psychedelic ego dissolution put further pressure on
the view that self-binding is necessary for consciousness.
Indeed, psychedelic consciousness, in which the mechanisms
of self-binding are compromised, is usually described as a state
of increased or intensified consciousness, leading Carhart-
Harris et al. (2014) to suggest that self-referential processes con-
strain consciousness rather than enabling it.
Recognizing the role of self-binding and self-models leaves
questions about the mechanisms of binding unanswered. As we
noted earlier many candidates have been proposed, including
various forms of temporal correlation (synchronization of cells
or functional coupling of brain regions; Singer 1999), conver-
gence of modular input streams in high-level integrative brain
regions (Damasio 1989), and even intracellular processes imple-
mented in cortical pyramidal cells (Bachmann 2015).
At this point, evidence about the actions of psychedelic
drugs and the experience of ego dissolution becomes relevant.
Under the influence of psychedelics, we continue to represent
the world and our bodies, but attention is captured and allo-
cated in different ways, experience seems both more intense
and less personal, and salience, affective feeling, and motiva-
tion become detached from personal goals and history.
Psychedelic Ego Dissolution
‘Classic’ (serotonin 2a receptor agonist) psychedelics such as
mescaline, psilocybin, and dimethyltryptamine (DMT, a key
constituent in the South American beverage ayahuasca) have a
long history of religious, spiritual, and medicinal use in various
cultures (Sessa 2012). Serious scientific interest in these sub-
stances was sparked by the accidental discovery in the 1940s of
the extremely potent psychoactive effects of lysergic acid dieth-
ylamide (LSD). During the 1950s and 1960s, psychedelics were
studied intensively as models of psychotic and mystical states,
as psychotherapeutic agents, and as instruments for mapping
the varieties of human consciousness (Osmond 1957). However,
uncontrolled use of the drugs in the context of the hippie coun-
terculture led to socio-political controversy, culminating in the
virtual cessation of human psychedelic research for some
decades.
Since the early 1990s this research has been slowly but
steadily resuming, with greater methodological rigour and
aided by the many new technical and theoretical innovations in
the mind and brain sciences. Several small studies have re-
vealed preliminary evidence for the safety and therapeutic effi-
cacy of carefully controlled psychedelic administration
(Griffiths et al. 2016; Ross et al. 2016; dos Santos et al. 2016a).
Meanwhile, neuroimaging investigations have begun to identify
neural correlates of the changes in cognition and consciousness
caused by psychedelics (dos Santos et al. 2016b).
The remarkable variability and alleged ineffability of psyche-
delic experiences pose barriers to describing these states. But
some progress has been made on charting the phenomenology
of the ‘antipodes of the mind’ (Huxley 1954; Masters and
Houston 1966; Shanon 2002). Psychedelics alter many aspects of
experience: sense perception, emotion, cognition, and the ap-
prehension of time and space. But of all their effects, perhaps
none is more provocative than the profound alteration to the or-
dinary sense of self or ego known as ‘ego dissolution’. The
countercultural icon Alan Watts, responsible for popularizing
both Eastern religion and psychedelics in the 1960s, wrote:
‘there are certain types of change which are usual enough to be
considered characteristic of psychedelics: the sense of slowed
or arrested time, and the alteration of “ego boundary”—that is,
of the sensation of one’s own identity’ (1964). Psychedelic sub-
jects often report that their sense of being a self, or ‘I’, distinct
from the rest of the world ‘out there’, is weakened, altered, or
abolished during the intoxication.
Ego dissolution experiences often occur in the context of
mystical states in which the ordinary sense of self is replaced
by a sense of union with an ultimate reality underlying all of
manifest existence—the famous ‘cosmic consciousness’ experi-
ence. Shanon describes the content of this apparent metaphysi-
cal realization as ‘idealistic monism with pantheistic overtones’
(2002, 163). The propensity of psychedelics to occasion such ex-
periences goes some way to explaining their history of religious
use. Indeed, intellectuals such as Watts and Aldous Huxley
were initially drawn to psychedelics due to a prior interest in
mysticism. With respect to ego dissolution, it is worth noting
that apprehending the non-existence of the individual self is a
central goal of Buddhist meditation (Albahari 2014). There is evi-
dence that mystical states are important for the therapeutic ef-
fects of psychedelics (Garcia-Romeu et al. 2016) so explaining
the ego dissolution experience is a crucial step in theorizing the
mechanisms of psychedelic treatment.
Early theoretical speculations about psychedelic ego dissolu-
tion strikingly anticipated the key ideas we will develop in the
rest of the paper. Savage (1955) and Klee (1963) both suggest ex-
planations of ego dissolution in terms of failures of mecha-
nisms of cognitive integration, and view these compromised
perceptual (particularly interoceptive) integrative mechanisms
as the basis of the self-model: ‘Lacking a reliable inflow (or inte-
gration) of stimuli, particularly from his body, the subject has
lost much of the basis for his self-percept’ (ibid., 465). Both au-
thors also liberally refer to the breakdown of cognitive processes
of expectation (cf. prediction) in explaining psychedelic ego dis-
solution. These early speculations sit very comfortably with
currently influential theoretical frameworks in cognitive neuro-
science, and suggest a bidirectional, mutually reinforcing rela-
tionship between self-representation and cognitive integration.
Another important point is that ego dissolution is not an all-
or-nothing affair. Different aspects of self-awareness may be
more or less disrupted in different ways on psychedelics.
Various authors have suggested that some vestiges of self-
awareness are preserved in most, if not all, psychedelic experi-
ences (Pahnke 1969; Shanon 2002), which helps explain the puz-
zling fact that autobiographical memories can apparently be
formed of these putatively selfless episodes (Metzinger 2005).
Moreover, there are aspects of psychedelic phenomenology
which may not be explicitly described as ego dissolution but are
still readily explained by our account. Subjects often find their
attention drawn to stimuli which they normally would not no-
tice; as Watts puts it, psychedelics ‘make the spotlight of con-
sciousness a floodlight which. . . brings to light unsuspected
details—details normally ignored because of their lack of signif-
icance’ (2002). Attention is no longer guided exclusively by
adaptive and egocentric goals and agendas; salience attribution
is no longer bound to personal concern.
Subjects often become less defensive and better able to view
their own thoughts and feelings dispassionately—one main ra-
tionale for early therapeutic use of these drugs (Eisner and
Cohen 1958). It is worth pointing out that subjects are not con-
fused about their bodily or cognitive boundaries here; they
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know they are having the experience. Rather it seems as if the
experiences, although intense and fascinating, are no longer au-
tomatically attributed to an entity. A very common experience
is to see one’s own dysfunctional emotional or behavioural pat-
terns, and the possibility of alternatives, with striking clarity
(Shanon 2002, 162–3). There is a tendency towards decentring
and the objectification of self-related phenomena which ordi-
narily are taken very personally and evoke strong emotional re-
activity (Soler et al. 2016). All of this suggests that, even when
the ego is not felt to dissolve altogether, the contents of con-
sciousness are less filtered through considerations of self-
relevance than is usual. Various cognitive processes which are
usually tightly coupled to self-representation become
decoupled from it.
Psychedelic experiences which lead subjects to strongly en-
dorse descriptions of ‘ego dissolution’ tend to feature dramatic
changes, such as the weakening of bodily boundaries or the loss
of the sense of ownership for thoughts and actions. The account
we will propose suggests that such paradigmatic ego dissolution
experiences are on a continuum with, and susceptible to the
same kind of explanation as, less dramatic experiences which
may not be described as ‘ego dissolution’ (cf. Letheby 2017).
These phenomena all result from disruption to predictive self-
binding processes; the differences depend on which specific as-
pects of the self-model are compromised, and to what extent.
Ego Dissolution as Unbinding
When Carhart-Harris et al. (2012) published the first human
fMRI studies of serotonergic psychedelics their results caused
quite a stir. Not only did they find that intravenous psilocybin
caused an overall reduction in neural activity (measured by
BOLD signal), apparently contradicting earlier PET studies show-
ing metabolic hyperactivity on psilocybin (Vollenweider et al.
1997). The decreases were concentrated mainly in the DMN.
Psilocybin decreased activity in DMN regions but also the integ-
rity of the network as measured by functional connectivity anal-
yses. The normal functional coupling between key DMN hubs
diminished—in particular, between the MPFC and the PCC.
Despite apparent inconsistency with PET results, the fMRI re-
sults cohered with MEG investigations in the same study. These
electrophysiological measures revealed another striking result:
decreased alpha power (which has been linked to inhibitory
processes) in the PCC correlated strongly with psychometric rat-
ings of ego dissolution.
Not all of these findings have been replicated in all subse-
quent psychedelic fMRI studies. But various observations sup-
port a role for downregulation of the DMN, and the PCC in
particular, in psychedelic ego dissolution. Palhano-Fontes et al.
(2015) reported decreased BOLD signal in DMN nodes including
the MPFC and PCC during ayahuasca intoxication. Meanwhile,
thinning of the PCC has been observed in long-term ayahuasca
users, with the degree of thinning correlated with both psycho-
metric scores for trait ‘self-transcendence’ and the extent of
prior ayahuasca use (Bouso et al. 2015). Interestingly, these aya-
huasca users equalled or outperformed matched controls on
tests of neuropsychological function, suggesting that this PCC
thinning is not linked to cognitive impairment. The connection
with findings about PCC deactivation in ‘effortless awareness’
meditation is obvious, and bolstered by the finding that acute
ayahuasca intoxication increases mindfulness-related capaci-
ties (Soler et al. 2016).
Matters have been complicated by recent apparently con-
flicting findings concerning the neural correlates of ego
dissolution. Lebedev et al. (2015) reported that disintegration not
of the DMN but of the SLN correlated with psilocybin-induced
ego dissolution. Referring to the apparent conflict with prior re-
sults, Lebedev et al. note that while the DMN is frequently linked
to the narrative self, the SLN has been linked with a more mini-
mal or embodied sense of self. The distinction between narra-
tive and minimal selfhood is commonplace in recent literature
(e.g. Blanke and Metzinger 2009) and will form part of our expla-
nation of this pattern of results too.
Lebedev et al. also found ego dissolution significantly corre-
lated with reductions in interhemispheric connectivity and in
functional coupling between the medial temporal lobes (MTL)
and cortical regions. This connects with earlier findings of
MTL–DMN decoupling under psilocybin (Carhart-Harris et al.
2014)—though in the earlier studies, this decoupling did not sig-
nificantly predict ego dissolution, while in the Lebedev et al.
study, the MTL decoupled from broader cortical regions than
just the DMN.
Most recently, Tagliazucchi et al. (2016) found that ego disso-
lution induced by LSD correlated with increased global func-
tional connectivity, with these increases resulting from a
breakdown in the integrity of resting-state networks. Here, the
DMN and SLN were both affected. The strongest specific correla-
tion with ego dissolution was decoupling of the parahippocam-
pal cortex (in the MTL) from the precuneus—a key DMN node
anatomically adjacent to the PCC. In this study, disintegration
of the DMN also tracked reduced mental time travel to the past,
consistent with this network’s hypothesized role in this process
(Speth et al. 2016).
What are we to make of these varied results? The major net-
works whose breakdown is linked to psychedelic ego dissolu-
tion have all independently been linked to one aspect or
another of self-representation. Lebedev et al. suggest a need for
fine-grained psychometric instruments capable of distinguish-
ing between alterations to different aspects of self-awareness.
Unfortunately, the ego dissolution inventory recently intro-
duced and validated by Nour et al. (2016), while an important
step, does not make such discriminations, so for now we are
stuck with theoretical speculation.4 However, our account will
predict that Lebedev et al. are correct: different aspects or levels
of the self-model are disrupted by psychedelics in different con-
ditions, compromising the integrity of distinct self-binding
processes.
We submit that an elegant resolution of these issues is as
follows. Sui and Humphreys are correct that the self is more
than a mere narrative posit. There is a robust self-
representation implemented in cortical midline nodes of the
DMN and SLN which plays a causal role in processing at all lev-
els, both enabling and emerging from cognitive binding pro-
cesses. This model includes both the representation of the self
as a persisting entity as well as the various perceptual, embod-
ied, and narrative representations of attributes, goals, and
events which are bound to that entity. The plastering of these
representations with ‘sticky “I, me, mine” labels that. . . prove
painful to remove’ (Kingsland 2016, 285) explains the anxiety
and dysphoria which sometimes attend ego dissolution experi-
ences (albeit relatively rarely in controlled settings).
The core idea is that the self-binding function identified by
Sui and Humphreys—the enhancement of binding for self-
relevant information—is explained by the supposition that
4 It is possible that this limitation might be overcome by the
use of additional techniques such as ‘microphenomenologi-
cal’ interviewing (Millie`re 2017).
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there is a self-model functioning according to predictive coding
principles. This model is a complex, hierarchical representation
of an object or entity having various attributes: spatiotemporal
location, a history, personality traits, ownership of a body, and
ownership and authorship of thoughts, feelings, and actions.
The binding of representations of stimuli which are incorpo-
rated into the self-model occurs via top-down predictions gen-
erated by that model. And there is a congenital bias in favour of
predictions generated by the self-model specifically because
this is an adaptive feature of cognitive architecture for any en-
tity that needs to parse experiences into internally and exter-
nally caused, to allocate resources preferentially to self-relevant
experiences, and to communicate and interact consistently
with others.
Meanwhile, the multi-layered nature of the self-model ex-
plains the apparently variable neural correlates of the same
coarse-grained subjective report of ‘ego dissolution’. Savage
suggests that on LSD ‘[changes] in body ego feeling usually pre-
cede changes in mental ego feeling and sometimes are the only
changes’ (1955, 11), evincing an early clinical recognition that
different aspects of the self-model might be affected to varying
extents by psychedelics. This common temporal sequence,
from blurring of body boundaries and loss of sense of ownership
for body parts through to later loss of sense of ownership for
thoughts, speaks further to the hierarchical architecture of the
self-model. (Note that this account entails the testable
prediction that psychedelic-induced disruption to SLN and
DMN integrity should be selectively associated with disruption
to embodied and narrative aspects of self-consciousness,
respectively.)
However, it does not follow from the existence of a robust,
causally efficacious, and multi-layered self-model that the en-
tity represented by this model exists. We agree with Metzinger
that it does not, and reject Dennett’s identification of the self
with narrative self-models as well as Hohwy and Michael’s
identification of the self with hierarchical predictive self-
models. This is because the self-model does not posit the
existence of a narrative or a model; it posits the existence of a
substance, a prime mover, a persistent entity that underlies,
owns, and initiates thoughts, experiences, and actions. In accor-
dance with predictive coding principles of cognitive efficiency,
the postulation of a bare particular to which events and attrib-
utes are bound is an economical means to prediction and expla-
nation of the flow of information.
Hohwy and Michael (2017) argue that the self-model quali-
fies as a self because it performs many of the functions attrib-
uted to the self, such as being a ‘hidden cause’ of thought,
emotion, and behaviour. It is true that the self-model does these
things. But on our view it is more like an existential placebo
than a successfully self-referential model. The expectation that
a drug treatment will work is a mental representation which is
capable of performing some of the functional role which it at-
tributes to its posited object—viz., the pharmacological activity
of a chemical. But this does not mean such an expectation is a
pharmacological activity of a chemical. It does some of the right
stuff, but it is the wrong kind of thing.
One way of putting the point, then, is that the concept SELF
is not purely functionally defined but has crucial ‘substantial’
metaphysical commitments; playing part of the functional role
of a self is an insufficient qualification for selfhood. Certainly
in some cases, the correct inference to make from empirical dis-
coveries is that a pretheoretically posited entity does in fact ex-
ist, but simply has a very different nature than we assumed. But
the placebo case just presented, and the case of caloric
mentioned earlier, show that sometimes the correct inference
clearly is an eliminative one; the explanatory work previously
delegated to the putative entity is being done by something so
different that identification is not on the cards. The pretheoretic
concept of SELF has sufficiently central and defining metaphysi-
cal commitments that it too merits such eliminative treatment.
Or consider the case of objects understood as substances or
particulars. The mind cannot help but attribute stably co-
occurring properties to objects; this is a successful predictive
strategy installed by evolution. But it is not necessarily the case
that stabilization of a collection of properties depends on unifi-
cation in an underlying entity. In the case of the self the stabil-
ity and regularity we experience very plausibly depends on a
network of hidden causes. The network plays the integrative
role attributed to the self, but unlike the self it is not a simple,
single thing. It has complex internal structure. Given this fact,
we think that the unity and simplicity postulated by the self-
model are erroneous. Ego dissolution helps expose this error by
decomposing the self.
An example is the relationship between syndromes and
their causes. Sometimes the co-occurrence of symptoms in a
syndrome is because of an underlying disease, in which case
the inference to a single hidden cause is correct. Often, how-
ever, a syndrome is the product of a network of interacting
causes not themselves causally unified at a deeper level.
Hohwy and Michael point out that we make and revise
judgements about ourselves which imply the existence of a uni-
fied entity (e.g. ‘I’ am generous, ‘I’ am stingy). They reasonably
ask: what grounds such judgements if there is no entity to
which they refer? Instrumentalists in the philosophy of science
have long pointed out that the predictive adequacy of theoreti-
cal posits does not entail the existence of such posits. We are
advocating an instrumentalist interpretation of the role of the
self-model.5 Of course this is consistent with the idea that in
many cases predictive adequacy is served by accuracy. There
are, for instance, good reasons for the success of a model that
locates the causes of my voluntary actions within the bound-
aries of my body. But the existence of a substantial entity initi-
ating the actions is not among those reasons.
5 It is common ground between Hohwy and Michael and our-
selves that hidden endogenous causes which produce regu-
lar patterns of integrated experience are tracked by the
multilevel self-model. That both the model and the (rela-
tively) invariant regularities exist is not in dispute, which is
why Hohwy and Michael are happy to regard the model as
the ‘real’ (i.e. causally efficacious) self. On our view, the rep-
resentation of causes of invariant patterns of experience is
insufficient to account for the feeling we have of being a
substantial self, in the same way as the existence of stability
in patterns of perceptual experience is insufficient to ac-
count for the perceptual experience of substantial objects.
The reason is that perceptual binding depends on the pos-
tulation of objects as part of the process. Our contention is
that self-binding exploits an analogous cognitive strategy at
all levels of the hierarchy. Tracking endogenous causes of
integrated experience postulates a substance around which
properties cohere. So our claim is that we experience not
only the emergent result (endogenously integrated patterns
of experience) but the locus of integration itself. The experi-
ence of ego dissolution allows us to experience ‘unbinding’
and understand the binding role played by the postulation
of a substantial self.
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Our argument, then, turns crucially on the claim that the
content of the self-model is that of an enduring substance
which is distinct from all the mental, emotional, and physical
activity of which it is supposed to be the owner. As Metzinger
(2005) points out, our ‘phenomenal avatar’ (conscious self-
model) is ‘transparent’: one does not feel like an avatar encoded
in a ‘biological data format’, one feels like a unitary, persisting
substance, or entity. The prevalence of this Cartesian intuition
in philosophical discussions of selfhood (as exhibited by stan-
dard responses to Parfit’s famous teleportation thought experi-
ments) supports this psychosemantic claim. Some may find
this claim introspectively dubitable. But it is precisely the ubiq-
uity of this sense of ‘I’ that makes it difficult to isolate
phenomenologically—and this is the reason why phenomena
such as ego dissolution are theoretically valuable (Millie`re 2017).
As Savage says in his discussion of LSD phenomenology, ‘By
and large the individual is not aware of the ego boundaries of
his mind and body and becomes aware of them only when a
change has occurred in them’ (1955, 6).
Psychedelics, by deconstructing the avatar, render it opaque
and acquaint subjects directly with its representational nature (cf.
Letheby 2015, 2016). Alterations in feelings of ‘mineness’ or owner-
ship, the sense of bodily boundaries, and so forth put pressure on
the predictive hypothesis of a unitary entity underlying and per-
sisting throughout experiences. The subsequent diminution in the
sense of solid selfhood shows subjects that this sense is ultimately
just one more conscious experience, rather than a transcendental
precondition of all such experiences. The transformative existen-
tial shock which often attends this discovery testifies to the fact
that a mere avatar is not what we, in the ordinary and sober
course of things, deeply feel and take ourselves to be.
Conclusion
Dennett (1992) famously argued that the self is a ‘centre of nar-
rative gravity’ akin to the centre of gravity of an object: an ab-
straction, but no less real or predictively useful for that. On the
predictive coding construal of the integrative self, the self-
model functions as a centre of representational gravity—not
just in narrative processes but also in lower-level affective, bod-
ily, and spatial processes. It is a representation of the 0point0
around which everything else revolves. But crucially, it is not a
representation as of a mere point, but as of a particular. This is
why we reject Dennett’s metaphysics of selfhood, as well as
Hohwy and Michael’s claim that the self-model has enough of
the right attributes to qualify as a self.
If our conjectures are right, the content of the self-model is
Cartesian: it is of a substance or an entity which has the proper-
ties and experiences. And here we agree with Metzinger that
there ‘is just no entity there, no individual substance, and scien-
tifically we can predict and explain everything we want to pre-
dict and explain in a much more parsimonious way’ (quoted in
Marshall 2016). Thus, our view is structurally analogous to
Mackie’s (1977) error theory of morality, conjoining the psycho-
semantic claim that the self-representation is as of a Cartesian
substance with the ontological claim that no such substance ex-
ists. It is also substantially similar to Metzinger’s views about
the self-model, developed in the context of a specific case and a
mechanistic proposal (self-binding on predictive processing
principles) about how the model performs its adaptive func-
tions for the organism.
All of this fits smoothly with the idea that the DMN and SLN
implement narrative and embodied aspects of self-representa-
tion, respectively. The self-representation as we conceive it
serves as an organizing principle at different levels and in dif-
ferent domains of processing. Perceptual representations are or-
ganized in an egocentric space; interoceptive representations
are interpreted as signals of adaptively relevant events or ‘core
relational themes’ (Prinz 2004); and narratives are structured
around the fortunes and prospects of a protagonist. At all levels,
salience is attributed, attention directed, and information inte-
grated in accordance with the relevance of information to the
organism’s goals. As James Kingsland (2016, 209) puts it, ‘we
have evolved into an ape that takes things personally’.
Funding
At the time that this research was conducted, Prof. Gerrans
was the recipient of an Australian Research Council Future
Fellowship (project number FT 110101050) funded by the
Australian Government, while Dr. Letheby was the recipient
of an Australian Postgraduate Award, also funded by the
Australian Government.
Conflict of interest statement. None declared.
References
Albahari M. Insight knowledge of no-self in Buddhism: an episte-
mic analysis. Philos Imprint 2014;14:1–30.
Bachmann T. How a (sub)cellular coincidence detection mecha-
nism featuring layer-5 pyramidal cells may help produce vari-
ous visual phenomena. Front Psychol 2015;6:1947. doi:10.3389/
fpsyg.2015.01947.
Ballard DH, Hinton GE, Senjowski TJ. Parallel visual computa-
tion. Nature 1983;306:21–6.
Blanke O, Metzinger T. Full-body illusions and minimal phenom-
enal selfhood. Trends Cogn Sci 2009;13:7.
Bouso JC, Palhano-Fontes F, Rodrıguez-Fornells A et al. Long-
term use of psychedelic drugs is associated with differences in
brain structure and personality in humans. Eur
Neuropsychopharmacol 2015;25:483–92.
Brewer JA, Garrison KA, Whitfield-Gabrieli S. What about the
“self” is processed in the posterior cingulate cortex?. Front Hum
Neurosci 2013;7:647. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00647.
Brewer JA, Garrison KA. The posterior cingulate cortex as a plau-
sible mechanistic target of meditation. Ann N Y Acad Sci
2014;1307:19–27.
Burwick T. The binding problem. WIREs Cogn Sci 2014;5:305–15.
Carhart-Harris RL, Erritzoe D, Williams T et al. Neural correlates
of the psychedelic state as determined by fMRI studies with
psilocybin. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2012;109:2138–43.
Carhart-Harris RL, Leech R, Hellyer PJ et al. The entropic brain: a
theory of conscious states informed by neuroimaging research
with psychedelic drugs. Front Hum Neurosci 2014;8:20.
doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00020.
D’Argembeau A. On the role of the ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex in self-processing: the valuation hypothesis. Front Hum
Neurosci 2013;7:372. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00372.
Damasio AR. The brain binds entities and events by multiregional
activation from convergence zones.Neural Comput 1989;1:123–32.
Damasio AR. Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain.
New York: Pantheon, 2010.
Davey CJ, Pujol J, Harrison BJ. Mapping the self in the brain’s de-
fault mode network. Neuroimage 2016;132:390–7.
Dennett D. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little Brown & Co,
1991.
Ego dissolution in psychedelic experience | 9
Dennett D. The self as a center of narrative gravity. In: Kessel F,
Cole P, Johnson D (eds.), Self and Consciousness: Multiple
Perspectives. Hillsdale: Erlbaum, 1992.
Dos Santos RG, Osorio FL, Crippa JAS et al. Antidepressive, anxio-
lytic, and antiaddictive effects of ayahuasca, psilocybin, and
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD): a systematic review of clini-
cal trials published in the last 25 years. Ther Adv
Psychopharmacol 2016a;6:193–213.
Dos Santos RG, Osorio FL, Crippa JAS et al. Classical hallucino-
gens and neuroimaging: a systematic review of human stud-
ies: hallucinogens and neuroimaging. Neurosci Biobehav Rev
2016b;71:715–28.
Eisner BG, Cohen S. Psychotherapy with lysergic acid diethylam-
ide. J Nerv Ment Dis 1958;127:528–39.
Garcia-Romeu A, Kersgaard B, Addy PH. Clinical applications of
hallucinogens: a review. Exp Clin Psychopharmacol 2016;24:229–68.
Gilboa A. Autobiographical and episodic memory—one and the
same? Evidence from prefrontal activation in neuroimaging
studies. Neuropsychologia 2004;42:1336–49.
Griffiths RR, Johnson MW, Carducci MA et al. Psilocybin produces
substantial and sustained decreases in depression and anxiety
in patients with life-threatening cancer: a randomized double-
blind trial. J Psychopharmacol 2016;30:1181–97.
Guterstam A, Bjo¨rnsdotter M, Gentile G et al. Posterior cingulate
cortex integrates the senses of self-location and body owner-
ship. Curr Biol 2015;25:1416–25.
Helmholtz H. Treatise on Physiological Optics [Translated from the
3rd German ed. Edited by Powell J.]. Rochester: Optical Society
of America, 1925.
Hohwy J. The Predictive Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013.
Hohwy J, Michael J. Why should any body have a self? In: de
Vignemont F, Alsmith AJT (eds.), The Subject’s Matter.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, PsyArXiv, 2017. http://osf.io/fm4cr.
Huxley A. The Doors of Perception. London: Chatto and Windus,
1954.
Kingsland J. Siddhartha’s Brain: The Science of Meditation,
Mindfulness and Enlightenment. London: Robinson, 2016.
Klee GD. Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD-25) and ego functions.
Arch Gen Psychiatry 1963;8:461–74.
Lebedev AV, Lo¨vde´n M, Rosenthal G et al. Finding the self by los-
ing the self: neural correlates of ego-dissolution under psilocy-
bin. Hum Brain Mapp 2015;36:3137–53.
Lebrecht S, Bar M, Barrett LF et al. Micro-valences: perceiving af-
fective valence in everyday objects. Front Psychol 2012;3:107.
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00107.
Leech R, Sharp DJ. The role of the posterior cingulate cortex in
cognition and disease. Brain 2014;137:12–32.
Letheby C. The philosophy of psychedelic transformation.
J Conscious Stud 2015;22:170–93.
Letheby C. The epistemic innocence of psychedelic states.
Conscious Cogn 2016;39:28–37.
Letheby C. Naturalizing psychedelic spirituality. Zygon 2017;52,
in press.
Lou HC, Changeux JP, Rosenstand A. Towards a cognitive neuro-
science of self-awareness. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 2017.
doi:10.1016/j.neuobiorev.2016.04.004.
Marshall R. All about the ego tunnel. 3AM Magazine, 2016.
http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/all-about-the-ego-tun
nel/ (8 December 2016, date last accessed).
Mackie JL. Ethics: Inventing Right andWrong. New York: Penguin, 1977.
Mashour GA. Cognitive unbinding: a neuroscientific paradigm of
general anesthesia and related states of unconsciousness.
Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2013;37:2751–9.
Masters REL, Houston J. The Varieties of Psychedelic Experience. New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1966.
Metzinger T. Pre´cis: being no one. Psyche 2005;11:1–35.
Millie`re R. Looking for the self. Front Hum Neurosci, 2017;11:245.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2017.00245.
Nour MM, Evans L, Nutt D et al. Ego-dissolution and psychedelics:
validation of the ego-dissolution inventory (EDI). Front Hum
Neurosci 2016;10:269. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2016.00269.
Osmond H. A review of the clinical effects of psychotomimetic
agents. Ann N Y Acad Sci 1957;66:418–34.
Pahnke WN. The psychedelic mystical experience in the
human encounter with death. Harvard Theol Rev
1969;62:1–21.
Palhano-Fontes F, Andrade KC, Tofoli LF et al. The psychedelic
state induced by ayahuasca modulates the activity and con-
nectivity of the default mode network. PLoS One
2015;10:e0118143.
Prinz JJ. Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Oxford
University Press, 2004.
Qin P, Northoff G. How is our self related to midline regions and
the default mode network? Neuroimage 2011;57:1221–33.
Raichle ME, MacLeod AM, Snyder AZ et al. A default mode of
brain function. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2001;98:676–82.
Revonsuo A. Binding and the phenomenal unity of conscious-
ness. Conscious Cogn 1999;8:173–85.
Ross S, Bossis A, Guss J et al. Rapid and sustained symptom
reduction following psilocybin treatment for anxiety and
depression in patients with life-threatening cancer: a ran-
domized controlled trial. J Psychopharmacol
2016;30:1165–80.
Savage C. Variations in ego feeling induced by d-lysergic acid di-
ethylamide (LSD-25). Psychoanal Rev 1955;42:1–16.
Sessa B. The Psychedelic Renaissance. London: Muswell Hill Press,
2012.
Seth AK. Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied
self. Trends Cogn Sci 2013;17:565–73.
Shanon B. The Antipodes of the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002.
Singer W. Neuronal synchrony: a versatile code for the definition
of relations? Neuron 1999;24:49–65.
Soler J, Elices M, Franquesa A et al. Exploring the therapeu-
tic potential of ayahuasca: acute intake increases
mindfulness-related capacities. Psychopharmacology
2016;233:823–9.
Speth J, Speth C, Kaelen M et al. Decreased mental time travel to
the past correlated with default-mode network disintegration
under lysergic acid diethylamide. J Psychopharmacol
2016;30:344–53.
Spreng RN, Grady CL. Patterns of brain activity supporting auto-
biographical memory, prospection, and theory of mind, and
their relationship to the default mode network. J Cogn Neurosci
2010;22:1112–23.
Sui J, Humphreys GW. The integrative self: how self-reference
integrates perception and memory. Trends Cogn Sci
2015;19:719–28.
Swanson LR. The predictive processing paradigm has roots in
Kant. Front Syst Neurosci 2016;10:79. doi:10.3389/
fnsys.2016.00079.
Tagliazucchi E, Roseman L, Kaelen M et al. Increased global func-
tional connectivity correlates with LSD-induced ego dissolu-
tion. Curr Biol 2016;26:1043–50.
van Essen DC, Anderson CH, Felleman DJ. Information process-
ing in the primate visual system: an integrated systems per-
spective. Science 1992;255:419–23.
10 | Letheby and Gerrans
Vollenweider FX, Leenders KL, Scharfetter C et al. Positron
emission tomography and fluorodeoxyglucose studies of
metabolic hyperfrontality and psychopathology in the
psilocybin model of psychosis. Neuropsychopharmacology
1997;16:357–72.
Watts A. A psychedelic experience: fact or fantasy? In:
Solomon D (ed.), LSD: The Consciousness-Expanding Drug. New
York: Putnam, 1964.
Ego dissolution in psychedelic experience | 11
